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#### Obama is pushing immigration – PC is key – it will pass

- momentum

- GOP needs a win

**McMorris-Santoro 10/15**

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### Liberalizing policy towards Cuba costs capital – Congress will upset other items on the agenda

**LeoGrande 12**

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Reform key to competitiveness and growth

**Trujillo and Melgoza 13**

Mr. Trujillo is chairman of the Trujillo Group, LLC and co-chairman of the Latino Donor Collaborative. Mr. Melgoza is the CEO of Geoscape International Inc. The Economic—and Demographic—Case for Immigration Reform, 2/21/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323951904578290471589119346.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

Since the November election, there has been much talk in Washington and on the pundit circuit about America's changing demographics, especially the "Latino vote" and the new realities of political campaigning. There has also been considerable wrangling over immigration and what it means for a country that is a nation of immigrants but is more crowded than it once was.¶ The immigration debate is significant to America's politics and culture, but it is also crucial to the country's economics, a subject that receives too little attention. Let's be blunt: The future wealth and well-being of the American people—the country's economic security, national security, business innovation, GDP growth and status in the global marketplace—require a comprehensive solution to the chronic problems caused by a broken immigration policy. In particular, the status of 11 million unauthorized Latino immigrants now living here must be resolved.¶ The economics are simple: Latinos spur demand. Seventy percent of the nation's gross domestic product is fueled by consumer spending. That means the Latino population—large, growing and increasingly prosperous—will play a key role in America's economic future.¶ Latinos are now by far the country's biggest minority-market segment. Including unauthorized residents, the Latino population now exceeds 54 million (not counting nearly four million in Puerto Rico). Blacks, in second place, number 39 million. The Latino population has increased by more than 52% since 2000. In the same period, the non-Latino white population grew less than 2% and blacks by 14%.¶ According to U.S. Census forecasts, the Latino population in America will reach 133 million by 2050. Those 133 million American Latinos will outnumber the populations of Japan and Russia, whose numbers are already in decline.¶ With growing numbers comes more spending: Latino purchasing power now exceeds $1.2 trillion and, according to the University of Georgia's Selig Center, will top $1.5 trillion by 2015. From a global perspective, that means America's Latino market would be the 11th-largest economy in the world—just below France, Italy and Mexico, and above South Korea, Spain and Indonesia. At $20,400 per capita, Latino America's purchasing power already exceeds the GDP per capita of all four BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China.¶ But Latinos' beneficial economic effect is hardly restricted to the demand side. A vital element of supply-side health is labor—workers, from the most talented who invent new products or start a business, to those just beginning to climb the ladder of self-improvement, whether through formal education or on-the-job training.¶ Nearly one in six American workers (16%) is Latino, with nearly 23 million Latinos in the U.S. holding jobs. You might not know it from media coverage of immigration issues, but Latinos have the highest labor-force participation rate (nearly 67%) of any American demographic group.¶ Slightly more than a quarter of children in the U.S. under age 18 are Latino. Based on existing trends, at least 1.1 million Latino youths will turn 18 each year for the next 20 years. Politicians may see 1.1 million new voters a year, but business owners see 1.1 million new workers with a strong work ethic. Given the aging of the country's baby boom generation—retiring at the rate of 10,000 a day for the next 18 years—the strength of the economy is increasingly linked to the promise of these younger workers.¶ Dire demographics threaten the economies in many developed nations, and the U.S. is not immune to the challenges posed by an aging population. But the problem will be considerably mitigated by immigrants who revitalize the workforce. The average later-life American, whose life expectancy nearly doubled during the 20th century, is already asking: Who is going to pay for the Social Security and Medicare promises of the federal government?¶ The answer: America's expanding, youthful immigrant population—another reason why ensuring educational opportunities at every level for all residents is in the national interest.¶ Getting the U.S. economy moving again requires action on many fronts: tax and regulatory reform, new approaches to energy, education and health care. But nothing is more important than immigration reform. Despite the impression left by much of the rhetoric in Washington, immigration reform is not just about politics. It's about jobs, growth and competitiveness—economic security, which in turn means national security.¶ To achieve these benefits, immigration policies and practices must be attuned to welcoming hardworking immigrants and to dealing fairly and smartly with those who are already in the U.S. regardless of their legal status. Legal immigration, including a guest-worker program that will bolster American business productivity, should be expanded in an intelligent way that is pro-investment and pro-growth. U.S. borders need to be secured against further illegal immigration.¶ Washington must send a clear signal—to the American people and to every level of government—that a coherent and enforceable immigration policy is in place and here to stay.

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

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#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

####  ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

### 1nc

**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction

**Escobar 95** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill

(Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistance have much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics,

patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central role in support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

### 1nc

#### Text: Congress should delegate the authority to remove United States sanctions on Cuba to the Department of State. The Department of State should pursue and enact the congressional delegation.

#### Counterplan solves the aff and doesn’t link to politics.

**Epstein and O’Hallaron 99** (David Epstein- Department of Political Science and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Columbia and Stanford University, and Sharyn O’Hallaron- Department of Political Science and the School of International and Public Affairs and Hoover Institution, Columbia and Stanford University, January 1999 (“The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers” – Cardozo Law Review) p. lexis

Our institutional analysis begins with the observation that there are two alternative modes for specifying the details of public policy. Policy can be made through the typical legislative process, in which a committee considers a bill and reports it to the floor of the chamber, and then a majority of the floor members must agree on a policy to enact. Alternatively, Congress can pass a law that delegates authority to regulatory agencies, allowing them to fill in some or all of the details of policy. The key is that, given a fixed amount of policy details to be specified, these two modes of poli [\*962] cymaking are substitutes for each other. To the degree that one is used more, the other will perforce be used less. Note also that it is Congress who chooses where policy is made. Legislators can either write detailed, exacting laws, in which case the executive branch will have little or no substantive input into policy, they can delegate the details to agencies, thereby giving the executive branch a substantial role in the policymaking process, or they can pick any point in between. Since legislators' primary goal is reelection, it follows that policy will be made so as to maximize legislators' reelection chances. Thus, delegation will follow the natural fault lines of legislators' political advantage. In making this institutional choice, legislators face costs either way. Making explicit laws requires legislative time and energy that might be profitably spent on more electorally productive activities. After all, one of the reasons bureaucracies are created is for agencies to implement policies in areas where Congress has neither the time nor expertise to micro-manage policy decisions, and by restricting flexibility, Congress would be limiting agencies' ability to adjust to changing circumstances. This tradeoff is captured well by Terry Moe in his discussion of regulatory structure: The most direct way [to control agencies] is for today's authorities to specify, in excruciating detail, precisely what the agency is to do and how it is to do it, leaving as little as possible to the discretionary judgment of bureaucrats - and thus as little as possible for future authorities to exercise control over, short of passing new legislation... Obviously, this is not a formula for creating effective organizations. In the interests of public protection, agencies are knowingly burdened with cumbersome, complicated, technically inappropriate structures that undermine their capacity to perform their jobs well. n40 Where oversight and monitoring problems do not exist, legislators would readily delegate authority to the executive branch, taking advantage of agency expertise, conserving scarce resources of time, staff, and energy, and **avoiding the logrolls, delays, and informational inefficiencies** associated with the committee system. Consider, for example, the issue of airline safety, which is characterized on the one hand by the need for technical expertise, and on the other hand by an almost complete absence of potential political benefits. That is, policymakers will receive little credit if airlines run well and no disasters occur, but they will have to with [\*963] stand intense scrutiny if something goes wrong. n41 Furthermore, legislative and executive preferences on this issue would tend to be almost perfectly aligned - have fewer accidents as long as the costs to airlines are not prohibitive. The set of individuals receiving benefits, the public who use the airlines, is diffused and ill organized, while those paying the costs of regulation, the airline companies, are well-organized and politically active. Furthermore, keeping in mind that deficiencies in the system are easily detectable, delegated power is relatively simple to monitor. For all these reasons, even if legislators had unlimited time and resources of their own (which they do not), delegation to the executive branch would be the preferred mode of policymaking.

### 1nc

#### Oil prices will remain above 100 dollars --- most predictive evidence proves

**AllAfrica News 7/30** - thuli Ncube (phd) Mthuli Ncube (phd), Chief Economist and Vice President of the African Development Bank (“High Oil Prices - Boom to Some, Doom to Others”, 7/30/2013, <http://m.allafrica.com/stories/201307301218.html/>) //RGP

Oil prices have remained consistently high and volatile over the past few years. According to estimates, they may remain this way at least until 2014. The Brent crude spot price, which averaged 112 dollars a barrel in 2012, is projected to remain above 100 dollars a barrel. This is at an average of 108 dollars and 101 dollars per barrel, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.¶ High oil prices may dampen the global economy, which is still struggling to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. High oil prices above 100 dollars can be explained by many factors and they may affect economies in an uneven way, with an unclear outcome for the global economy as a whole. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 50pc increase in oil prices, due to a supply shock, would lead to a one to 1.5pc decrease in output, in many regions of the world.¶ Rising oil prices will affect African economies differently depending on whether they are net exporters or net importers of the commodity. For oil-importing economies, high oil prices could translate into high import bills with adverse effects on inflation, production and employment.¶ In contrast, oil-exporting economies could benefit from high oil prices, because an increase in oil revenues improves their balance of payments. In addition, price volatility may harm both importers and exporters of oil. It lowers, for instance, the predictability of marginal costs of production for companies. The uncertainty regarding their cash flows may induce companies to reduce their investments and limit job creation, which can consequently harm economic growth.¶ Oil prices have increased since 2003, from less than 40 dollars to more than 100 dollars per barrel today. Oil prices fell sharply in 2008, before recovering steadily since then. Prices were volatile during 2011 and 2012, mainly because of the Arab Spring and events in Libya, in addition to conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. Many uncertain and conflicting factors on both supply and demand sides have contributed to the persistent high oil prices in recent years.¶ Geopolitical factors are the main causes that drove up oil prices in producing countries. In the past decade, wars in Iraq and political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa have affected the oil market.¶ More recently, disagreements between Western nations and Iran - one of the largest oil producers and exporters in the world - have fuelled risks of sharp disruptions in oil supplies globally. This, in turn, had a significant impact on prices of the commodity. In contrast, major oil producing countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, may not be able to boost production and instead have to cover losses elsewhere, as their capacities are reaching their limit. The decline in aggregate oil inventories and high costs of oil extraction and production are other supply-side factors affecting oil prices.¶ Increasing demand from major emerging economies, such as China and India, has also played an important role in keeping oil prices persistently high over the past years. The Asian continent surpassed the US and is now the largest consumer of oil in the world.¶ Despite the slowdown in economic growth in China and India, demand will remain higher. This will keep oil prices at high levels. Furthermore, as growth is resuming in the US and as the crisis in the euro area seems to be easing, global demand for oil may increase.

#### Loosening the embargo causes US energy independence

**Carroll 8 -** Latin American correspondent for The Guardian (Rory, The Guardian, “20bn Barrel Oil Discovery Puts Cuba in the Big League,” 10/17/2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/18/cuban-oil>) //RGP

Friends and foes have called Cuba many things - a progressive beacon, a quixotic underdog, an oppressive tyranny - but no one has called it lucky, until now .¶ Mother nature, it emerged this week, appears to have blessed the island with enough oil reserves to vault it into the ranks of energy powers. The government announced there may be more than 20bn barrels of recoverable oil in offshore fields in Cuba's share of the Gulf of Mexico, more than twice the previous estimate.¶ If confirmed, it puts Cuba's reserves on par with those of the US and into the world's top 20. Drilling is expected to start next year by Cuba's state oil company Cubapetroleo, or Cupet.¶ "It would change their whole equation. The government would have more money and no longer be dependent on foreign oil," said Kirby Jones, founder of the Washington-based US-Cuba Trade Association. "It could join the club of oil exporting nations."¶ "We have more data. I'm almost certain that if they ask for all the data we have, (their estimate) is going to grow considerably," said Cupet's exploration manager, Rafael Tenreyro Perez.¶ Havana based its dramatically higher estimate mainly on comparisons with oil output from similar geological structures off the coasts of Mexico and the US. Cuba's undersea geology was "very similar" to Mexico's giant Cantarell oil field in the Bay of Campeche, said Tenreyro.¶ A consortium of companies led by Spain's Repsol had tested wells and were expected to begin drilling the first production well in mid-2009, and possibly several more later in the year, he said.¶ Cuba currently produces about 60,000 barrels of oil daily, covering almost half of its needs, and imports the rest from Venezuela in return for Cuban doctors and sports instructors. Even that barter system puts a strain on an impoverished economy in which Cubans earn an average monthly salary of $20.¶ Subsidised grocery staples, health care and education help make ends meet but an old joke - that the three biggest failings of the revolution are breakfast, lunch and dinner - still does the rounds. Last month hardships were compounded by tropical storms that shredded crops and devastated coastal towns.¶ "This news about the oil reserves could not have come at a better time for the regime," said Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba energy specialist at the University of Nebraska.¶ However there is little prospect of Cuba becoming a communist version of Kuwait. Its oil is more than a mile deep under the ocean and difficult and expensive to extract. The four-decade-old US economic embargo prevents several of Cuba's potential oil partners - notably Brazil, Norway and Spain - from using valuable first-generation technology.¶ "You're looking at three to five years minimum before any meaningful returns," said Benjamin-Alvarado.¶ Even so, Cuba is a master at stretching resources. President Raul Castro, who took over from brother Fidel, has promised to deliver improvements to daily life to shore up the legitimacy of the revolution as it approaches its 50th anniversary.¶ Cuba's unexpected arrival into the big oil league could increase pressure on the next administration to loosen the embargo to let US oil companies participate in the bonanza and reduce US dependency on the middle east, said Jones. "Up until now the embargo did not really impact on us in a substantive, strategic way. Oil is different. It's something we need and want."

#### Causes OPEC flood --- empirics

**Kole 7 –** AP correspondent (William, NWI, “Despite Rising Prices, OPEC Appears to be in No Rush to Raise its Output Targets”, 9/8/2007, <http://nwitimes.com/articles/2007/09/08/business/business/doc7e79bb33cb7ec6f28625734f00723bfd.txt>) //RGP

If you remember what happened in the 1970's (look it up if you don't) you will find the biggest fear OPEC has. It is that oil prices will go up and stay high long enough to fuel investment into conservation and alternative energy sources to the point that a critical mass is reached and the need for their oil is greatly diminished or replaced by other energy sources they don't control. That's exactly what started happening in the 1970's and it took OPEC opening up the tap to make oil cheap again over a decade to reverse the trends. The result was that interest in conservation and alternative energy waned and investments dried up in the face of cheap oil again. We are once again nearing that point and you can expect to see OPEC flood the market again if they see us getting serious with conservation and alternative energy sources that compete with, or worse yet, actually replace demand for their oil. OPEC walks the fine line between price and demand and wants to keep us hooked up to their oil like a bunch of junkies on drugs while making as much money as possible.

#### Drop below 100 dollars causes Russian economic collapse --- it’s on the brink now

**Whitmore 13** - senior Correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, covering European security, energy and military issues and domestic developments in Russia (Brian, The Power Vertical, “After The Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013,” 1/2/2013, <http://www.rferl.org/content/after-the-storm-trends-to-watch-in-russia-in-2013/24813957.html>) //RGP

It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. ¶ As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year.¶ A fledgling middle class remains hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement continues to struggle to find its voice.¶ With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs.¶ "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era, but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception."¶ With economic headwinds on the horizon, generational conflict brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified.¶ So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year.¶ The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State¶ If 2012 was all about politics, 2013 will also be about economics.¶ The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -- oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds.¶ World oil prices, currently hovering between $90 and $100 per barrel, are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could prove catastrophic for the Russian economy.¶ Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.

#### Nuclear war

**Filger 9** – Huffington Post author (Sheldon, Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” 5/10/2009, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>) //RGP

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### adv 1

#### No Impact- Iranian prolif stabilizes the region – creates a counter to Israeli nukes.

**Kaye & Wehrey, 07** [Dalia Dassa Kaye, Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, Frederic M. Wehrey, International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,” Survival, 49: 2, 111-128] camp

Public opinion in the Arab world is largely sympathetic to an Iranian nuclear option, viewing it as a counter to Israel and a way to overcome the perceived double standard of allowing Israel, but not others in the region, to get away with the bomb.55 Turkish public opinion also does not perceive Iran or the nuclear issue in particular as a threat, nor does the current Islamist leadership in Ankara (serious concerns are largely limited to the Turkish military).56 Some regional security elites also expressed some acceptance, and even benefits, of a nuclear Iran, although they are more inclined to recognise the accompanying dangers than the public at large. In Jordan, for example, some strategic analysts suggested that Iran could serve as a balance to Israel and suggested that many in the region view the issue this way.57 A high-level Jordanian official raised the example of South Asia to suggest that the nuclear tests actually had a stabilising regional effect by leading to a renewed peace effort.58 Interestingly, one Israeli analyst also suggested that a bilateral nuclear balance between Israel and Iran – while dangerous in many other ways – could also lead to political agreements by putting more pressure on Israel to deal with Syria and Lebanon.59 In the Gulf, regional tolerance of a nuclear-armed Iran is even more likely, particularly by Oman. Given its long history of economic and cultural interdependence with Iran, Muscat has adopted the most accomodating posture of all the Gulf states. A retired Omani military commander pointed to Iran’s pre- revolutionary support of Oman during the 1970s insurgency in the western Dhofar region, arguing for a degree of continuity in neighbourly relations that would overcome Iran’s belligerent rhetoric or regional fears of a ‘Shia bomb’.60 Why should we be more afraid of a nuclear-armed Iran than a nuclear Pakistan?’ this same official asked. In contrast to fears of an emboldened Iran, he believed that a nuclear-armed Iran would incur increased economic burdens and that its conventional forces would atrophy. A Kuwaiti scholar echoed this prediction of economic decline, arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran, faced with increased isolation and sanctions, warranted increased Kuwaiti investment in anti-smuggling capabilities, to counter the anticipated spike in Iranian black-market activity.61

#### Squo solves – A Small Number of Proliferators Is Outnumbered By Mass Non-Prolif

**ACA ’13** [Arms Control Association, Updated: April 2013, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> //SD]

At the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States hoped to maintain a monopoly on its new weapon, but the secrets for making nuclear weapons soon spread. Four years after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear device. The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964) followed. Seeking to prevent the nuclear weapon ranks from expanding further, the United States and other like-minded states negotiated the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. In the decades since, several states have abandoned nuclear weapons programs, but others have defied the NPT. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never signed the treaty and possess nuclear arsenals. Iraq initiated a secret nuclear program under Saddam Hussein before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 and has tested nuclear devices since that time. Iran and Libya have pursued secret nuclear activities in violation of the treaty’s terms, and Syria is suspected of doing the same. Still, **nuclear nonproliferation successes outnumber failures and dire forecasts decades ago** that the world would be home to dozens of states armed with nuclear weapons have not come to pass. Nuclear-Weapon States: The nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are the five states—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States—officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT. Although the treaty legitimizes these states’ nuclear arsenals, it also establishes that they are not supposed to build and maintain such weapons in perpetuity. Article VI of the treaty holds that each state-party is to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” In 2000, the five NWS committed themselves to an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” But for now, the five continue to retain the bulk of their nuclear forces. Because of the secretive nature with which most governments treat information about their nuclear arsenals, most of the figures below are best estimates of each nuclear-weapon state’s nuclear holdings, including both strategic warheads and lower-yield devices referred to as tactical weapons. Russia and the United States also retain thousands of retired warheads planned for dismantlement, not included here. China: About 240 total warheads. France: Fewer than 300 operational warheads. Russia: Approximately 1,480 deployed strategic warheads [1]. The Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has another 1,022 nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Additional thousands are awaiting dismantlement. United Kingdom: Fewer than 160 deployed strategic warheads, total stockpile of up to 225. United States: Approximately 5,113 nuclear warheads [2], including tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. According to the latest official New START declaration, the United States deploys 1,654 strategic nuclear warheads on 792 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers [1]. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the United States' nondeployed strategic arsenal is approximately 2,800 warheads and the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal numbers 500 warheads. Additional warheads are retired and await dismantlement. Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors: Three states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—never joined the NPT and are known to possess nuclear weapons. **Claiming its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes**, India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. That test spurred Pakistan to ramp up work on its secret nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan both publicly demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities with a round of tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test, does not admit to or deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to possess nuclear arms. The following arsenal estimates are based on the amount of fissile material—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—that each of the states is estimated to have produced. Fissile material is the key element for making nuclear weapons. India and Israel are believed to use plutonium in their weapons, while Pakistan is thought to use highly enriched uranium. India: Up to 100 nuclear warheads. Israel: Between 75 to 200 nuclear warheads. Pakistan: Between 90 to 110 nuclear warheads. States of Immediate Proliferation Concern: Iran is pursuing a uranium-enrichment program and other projects that could provide it with the capability to produce bomb-grade fissile material and develop nuclear weapons within the next several years. In contrast, North Korea has the material to produce a small number of nuclear weapons, announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and tested nuclear devices. Uncertainty persists about how many additional nuclear devices North Korea has assembled beyond those it has tested. In September 2005, Pyongyang “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” Iran: No known weapons or sufficient fissile material stockpiles to build weapons. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the institution charged with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in 2003 that Iran had undertaken covert nuclear activities to establish the capacity to indigenously produce fissile material. The IAEA is continuing its investigation and monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear program. North Korea: Has separated enough plutonium for roughly 4-8 nuclear warheads. North Korea unveiled a centrifuge facility in 2010, buts ability to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons remains unclear. Syria: In September 2007, Israel conducted an airstrike on what U.S. officials have alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor. Intelligence officials briefed members of congress on the airstrike eight months later in April 2008, discussing the evidence leading to their judgment that the site was an undeclared nuclear reactor. While the extent of Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation is unclear, it is believed to have begun in 1997. Subsequent IAEA investigations into the U.S. claims uncovered traces of undeclared man-made uranium particles at both the site of the destroyed facility and Syria’s declared research reactor. Syria has failed to provide adequate cooperation to the IAEA in order to clarify the nature of the destroyed facility and procurement efforts that could be related to a nuclear program. States That Had Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Weapons Programs at One Time: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, but returned them to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. South Africa secretly developed and dismantled a small number of nuclear warheads and also joined the NPT in 1991. Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but was forced to verifiably dismantle it under the supervision of UN inspectors. The U.S.-led March 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent capture of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein definitively ended his regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Libya voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved nuclear weapons programs.

#### All states are rational – proliferation-based crises are empirically denied

**Tepperman 9** (Jonathan Tepperman, member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/28/2009, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb”, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html> | JJ)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price**. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable**. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time."

### adv 2

#### Scarcity doesn’t cause war

**Deudney 99** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

Another major limitation of most studies on environmental conflict is that they rarely consider the character of the overall international system in assessing the prospects for conflict and violence. Of course, it is impossible to analyze everything at once, but conclusions about conflictual outcomes are premature until the main features of the world political system are factored in. The frequency with which environmental scarcity and conflict will produce violent conflict, particularly interstate wars, is profoundly shaped by six features of contemporary world politics: (1) the prevalance of capitalism and the extent of international trade; (2) the existence of numerous functional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic communities; (3) highly developed state-system institutions; and (4) the existence of nuclear weapons; (5) the widespread diffusion of conventional weaponry; and (6) the influence of a hegemonic coalition of liberal constitutional democracies. These deeply rooted material and institutional features of the contemporary world order greatly reduce the likelihood that environmental scarcities and change will lead to interstate violence (see figure 8.1).

#### OAS cred unsustainable – rising alternatives

**Lee ‘12** – Senior Production Editor (Brianna, “The Organization of American States,” 4/13/12, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945)//SJF

CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." However, analysts say, since the Democratic Charter was signed, the organization's consensus around democracy promotion has atrophied. One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America. Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream." Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008. Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a strong call to reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.

#### Protectionism won’t spiral out of control .

**Marshall, 09** (Andrew – asia political risk correspondent, Assault on free trade a key political risk, Reuters, 1/21/2009, p. lexis)

PREVENTING DISASTER Despite the risks, many analysts argue that a wholesale retreat into protectionism can be averted, because globalization has brought benefits governments will not want to reverse. "Fears that the financial crisis is ushering in an era of intensive nationalism and protectionism are overwrought," said Control Risks in its outlook for 2009. "The financial crisis has ... demonstrated that the global economy remains deeply interconnected and dependent on forging compromises between domestic politics and international capital." Cheap imports from emerging markets have brought significant benefits to consumers and companies in the developed world. "This factor, combined with the entrenched nature of global supply chains, is likely to **limit** the political **tolerance for protectionism**, at least in the main developed-country markets and in emerging markets that are highly dependent on exports," the Economist Intelligence Unit said.

#### Multilateralism failure inevitable

**MacMillan 09** (MacMillan Commonwealth Secretariat Trade Economist, Euan “Explaining rising regionalism and failing multilateralism :consensus decision-making and expanding WTO membership”, 2009-10, Publisher- University College Dublin. School of Economics)

<http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/handle/10197/2614/wp09.16.pdf?sequence=1>

The beleaguered progress of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the World Trade ¶ Organisation (WTO) presents something of a puzzle for economic theory: if multilateral ¶ trade negotiations are an effective forum for liberalisation (as has been the case¶ historically), then why have the current round of talks struggled amid the proliferation of ¶ preferential trade agreements (PTAs)? Numerous authors have posited that this recent ¶ phenomenon may in part be precipitated by the combination of the specific decisionmaking process of the WTO and the fact that the current membership of the WTO is ¶ larger and more diverse than it was during previous rounds.2¶ Two features of WTO ¶ jurisprudence underpin this diagnosis: the requirement that WTO decision-making be ¶ formed by consensus; and the single-undertaking principle. The combination of these ¶ two elements means that all aspects of a WTO negotiating round must be acceptable to ¶ all WTO members before the round can be concluded. Accordingly, it is argued that ¶ reaching unanimous decisions amongst an expanded and more diverse membership will ¶ inevitably be frustrated by coordination failure.

#### Unilateralism is sustainable - it is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)//VP

Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts. This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### The plan is surrender – it emboldens global regimes and collapses US influence – takes out the whole advantage

**Brooks ‘9** Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter – Heritage foundation “Keep the Embargo, O“ April 16, 2009 [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)//EB](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o%29//EB)

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Plan is insufficient-formal international binding compacts are key to effective restraint- their author

**Lake, 10–** Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego (David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf>)//TL

Retying the Knots The safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and certainly deeper than in the 1990s—more like NATO than the ad hoc coalitions of the new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by competition with the Soviet Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands will have to be even stronger than those in NATO. 47 The great paradox of contemporary international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United States requires even more binding constraints on its policy if it is to preserve the authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the globe. The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda. Since it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore, 48 Americans need not be overly concerned about “runaway” organizations or global mission creep. At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreci-ate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits—security, free trade, economic prosperity—have developed a taken-for-granted quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they receive from the country’s position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see multilateral institutions constraining the country’s freedom of action. Precisely because unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and For some attractive, any constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear. 49

# 2nc

#### Venezuelan oil investment would meet

De Cordoba and Munoz 13 (1/11/2013, JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA and SARA MUÑOZ, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html, JMP)

"It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector.

#### So would Mexican renewables

**Barber 11** – Editor @ Energy Trend

(DA, “Mexico’s Emerging Solar Market,” http://pv.energytrend.com/research/Mexico\_Emerging\_Solar\_Market.html)//BB

Today, solar power in Mexico amounts to less than 1 percent of Mexico's total energy production, meaning utility-scale solar power is not only in its infancy, it is a huge opportunity.

But entry into the Mexican solar industry market has specific hurdles. Mexican utilities are state-owned, making it difficult for independent power providers (IPPs) to enter the market, which includes power generation, transmission and distribution controlled by the government’s Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE). This means any development of the solar industry requires government backing. But the last few years has seen some progress: IPPs are now permitted to sell power to CFE for the industrial use, and corporations can produce electricity up to 30 MW for their own use. Though any surplus power can be sold to the state-owned national grid, the lucrative residential solar power market remains totally under state control.

#### And so would normalizing trade relations with Cuba

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### Engagement towards a government must be conditional, the plan isn’t.

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### Low oil prices crush the Bahraini economy --- creates instability

**Reuters 13** (“Bahrain parliament approves 11 pct rise in 2013 budget spending”, 6-25, http://www.gulfbase.com/news/bahrain-parliament-approves-11-pct-rise-in-2013-budget-spending/239512, Deech)

The tiny island state faces difficult choices between boosting state spending to **support** the economy in the face of political unrest, and grappling with a rising state budget deficit, by far the largest in the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council as a proportion of Bahrain's economy. Bahrain expanded its original 2012 expenditure plan by nearly 19 percent in September 2011 after protesters, inspired by revolts elsewhere in the Arab world, took to the streets of Manama demanding political reforms. The International Monetary Fund warned in May that the island needed to reform its public finances in the medium term to avoid its debt burden becoming **unsustainable**. Softness in oil prices is one **threat**. Bahrain now expects state revenue to dip to 2.79 billion dinars in each of the years 2013 and 2014 from an actual 3.0 billion last year, based on an average budgeted oil price of $90 per barrel. It predicts a budget deficit of 833.2 million dinars in 2013, widening to 914.4 million in the following year. Last November's initial budget plan had forecast shortfalls of 662.0 million dinars and 752.9 million. The actual deficit in 2012 widened sevenfold to 227 million dinars, though it was still smaller than the government's original projection. The oil price which the country needs to balance its budget reached a critical level of $115 per barrel in 2012, making Bahrain **vulnerable** to any **sustained decline** in oil prices, the IMF said. The country relies on output from the Abu Safa oilfield shared with Saudi Arabia - which **supports** Bahrain's Sunni rulers politically - for some 70 percent of its budget revenue. Analysts believe Manama's share of the oil could be raised if its budget runs into trouble.

#### Bahrain instability spills over --- ensures Iranian adventurism, economic collapse, and Pakistan takeover

**Pearson 11** (Peter, General – U.S. Army, Former Deputy Commander of SOUTHCOM – NATO, “Bahrain and the Arab Spring: time for some realism”, The Telegraph, August, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/8681885/Bahrain-and-the-Arab-Spring-time-for-some-realism.html)

At this point, it’s worth considering what would have been the consequences if Bahrain had deteriorated into civil war: Iran would have been emboldened; Sunni Arabs in Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, would have felt increasingly insecure and almost certainly taken action; the world economy would have taken a **knock** from the impact of higher oil prices; the West would have lost a firmly western-looking ally; and extreme Islamist elements in Pakistan and around the world would have felt emboldened. Instead, Bahrain’s security forces intervened and other Gulf states, led by the Saudis, occupied key strategic installations. Even as order was being restored, sadly at the cost of two dozen lives, the reality of sectarian violence loomed. Reporting was one sided. For example, it never reached the public domain that Sunnis needing medical treatment at the Salmaniya hospital were pre-screened out. Some arriving in ambulances were attacked. Sunni migrant workers from the Indian sub-continent were also attacked. Four were killed and one had his tongue cut out. With a Shia population on its Gulf coast, there was and remains little prospect of Saudi Arabia acquiescing in the establishment of a Shia-dominated state on its doorstep. A transition to full democracy would in reality be a transition to something very different. In his brilliant book on the art of war in the modern world, General Sir Rupert Smith argued that the paradigm of industrialised warfare between nation states has given way to what he called "war amongst the people". Igniting Shia-Sunni tensions in Bahrain would inevitably have repercussions **across a region** that is geo-strategically the most fragile and dangerous in the world. Once started, it could be years and more probably decades before a new equilibrium is found. As Clausewitz wrote, the only decisive victory is the last one. Sometimes, perhaps, it’s more prudent to hang on to what you have and make the best of it. Bahrain’s rulers will have learned the lessons from the earlier part of the year and will, no doubt, reflect during Ramadan on how best to take forward their country. In the future, it will be seen as a major watershed in that nation’s history from which there was no going back. Its government has taken the unprecedented step of inviting UN human rights experts to find out what happened at the Pearl Roundabout and afterwards, learn from the mistakes of the past and turn a new page. A stable Bahrain with laws and practices that are fair and acceptable to all bar the extremists would not only be in the interests of all the Bahraini citizens but, clearly, of the wider region and beyond.

#### Global nuclear war

**Morgan 7** (Stephen J., Former Member – British Labour Party Executive Committee, Author – “The Mind of a Terrorist Fundamentalist – the Cult of Al Qaeda”, “Better Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan”, 3-4, http://ezinearticles.com/?Better-Another-Taliban-Afghanistan,-than-a-Taliban-NUCLEAR-Pakistan?&id=475808)

Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly **nuclear war**, between Pakistan and India **could not be ruled out**. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a **nuclear war would** now again **become a** real **strategic possibility**. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

#### Prices will remain high – long term trends prove

**Lynch 10/16** – Forbes contributor, analyzes petroleum economics and energy policy (Michael, Forbes, “Are Greater Fools Driving Oil Prices?,” 10/16/2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2013/10/16/are-greater-fools-driving-oil-prices/>) //RGP

Asset bubbles make theorists crazy, because they seem to be obvious, at least in hindsight, and yet constantly recur. Some academic economists argue that price and value are identical, so that by definition, nothing is ever overpriced. Others now undertake neurological studies of trading to show that people seem to pay attention to what others are doing, in part, confirming the idea that many in the market plan to make money, not by spotting better values in assets, but by making it off the so-called “greater-fool”. That is, recognizing a bubble, but riding it up and getting out when it bursts, leaving the “greater fool” to take the losses.¶ Keynes had the primordial insight that traders set prices based on their perceptions, not just market fundamentals. And this is done on a short-term, relative basis: no one weighs prices compared to fundamentals a decade ago, but relative to yesterday. Short-term prices move less as the result of rational assessment of market fundamentals than in response to the latest news.¶ And Charles Kindleberger, in his classic “Manias, Panics and Crashes” noted that a surge in liquidity often causes asset bubbles, which then leads to trend buying, (the fancy name for the greater fool process). Prices rise because traders/investors realize that they are rising, and try to profit. Such a market is distinguished when prices rise rapidly without any noticeable change in the fundamentals.¶ Perfect example: In 2008, oil prices rose from $90 in February to a high of $137/barrel in mid-July. Any number of pundits insisted that this record price level was just the beginning of a new bull run, while, in early May, I wrote an article arguing that prices would eventually come down—and was slammed by netizens as foolish. Even for those who believe that long-term prices should rise, the incredible increase in 2008, coming at a time of strong asset inflation, should have been obvious as a bubble.¶ But oil prices are different, mainly because so much of world oil supply is subject to sudden and unexpected disruptions. This makes it hard to see what the price would be if only fundamental indicators like inventories were considered. Yet the fact that prices are high now but have not run up sharply, and at a time when geopolitical risks appear high, suggests that we are not seeing trend buying or a bubble, but rather prices inflated by real world events, actual or potential.¶ What would reverse this? Stability in Libya, Iraq and Nigeria, both political and in their oil production. If it persisted for a time, traders would come to feel the threat to supply had eased. An agreement with Iran over its nuclear program that unleashed its shut-in oil capacity would also make a massive difference. None of these seems likely in the next year or so, but beyond that, could happen.¶ Alternatively, if surplus oil production capacity in OPEC rises to the point where any moderate disruption in supply could easily be met, then traders would become more blasé about political unrest in the Middle East or Africa. In the 1980s, OPEC had very high surplus capacity, nominally 15 million barrels a day. Because of that, even the bloody destructive war between Iran and Iraq, including attacks on oil tankers, did not move prices.

#### US doesn’t affect global prices

**Breaking Energy 8/16** – ([Conway Irwin,](http://breakingenergy.com/author/breakingconwayirwin1/) “Why Hasn’t the US Oil Boom Brought Down Gasoline Prices? It Probably Has,” 8/16/2013, <http://breakingenergy.com/2013/07/16/why-hasnt-the-us-oil-boom-brought-down-gasoline-prices-it-probably-has/>) //RGP

US production growth can only do so much to ease the financial burden on US consumers, said President of trade group the Petroleum Marketers Association of America Dan Gilligan. “Because Bakken and Eagle Ford oil shale developments are delivered to Cushing, Oklahoma, they put downward price pressure on the WTI [West Texas Intermediate] contract, but only have a modest impact on the world’s oil prices because the WTI crude oil is landlocked and doesn’t have an outlet to the world oil market.”¶ And consumers should not expect a return to sub-$3.00/gallon prices. “Motorists are understandably frustrated and squeezed,” said AAA Director of Federal Relations Chris Plaushin. But “the days of the national pump price below $3/gallon is likely a thing of the past”, he said.¶ This comes down, in large part, to expectations that crude oil prices will remain at or near current levels.¶ “We are in a world of $100 [per barrel] crude oil, and we do not expect a significant decrease this summer,” said Bill Klesse, Chief Executive of Valero, the world’s largest independent refiner. “The US remains a crude oil importer. Crude prices clearly reflect movements in the global marketplace, and prices that we pay must be high enough to attract those barrels to our market.”¶ And non-market factors, such as delays to infrastructure additions, and the high cost of compliance with mandates under the Renewable Fuel Standard, may push prices even higher.

#### Oil prices will remain high – US production doesn’t affect

**The Inquistr 10/16** – (“United States Oil Production Beats Saudia Arabia Via Fracking, Why Are Gas Prices High?” 10/16/2013, <http://www.inquisitr.com/995051/united-states-oil-production-saudia-arabia-fracking-why-are-gas-prices-so-high/>) //RGP

As United States oil production surpasses Saudia Arabia some people probably want to know why gas price are still so high.¶ As previously reported by The Inquisitr, an oil fracking EPA study determined they couldn’t a definitive case where fracking has contaminated oil. Although, some studies claim fracking can lead to more earthquakes.¶ And it just so happens that the reason United States oil production has has risen more than 50 percent in the past five years is due to fracking. Most of the US crude oil, and natural gas, was stuck in shale rock and was unreachable for many years. Fracking works by pumping a mix of water and chemicals down into wells in order to break up the rock and release the trapped oil. But it took advancements in the fracking technology before it became cost effective for United States oil production.¶ In fact, the US met 89 percent of its own energy needs in March of 2013 and as of now is the world’s largest oil producer, surpassing even Saudia Arabia according to the PIRA Energy Group:¶ “(The U.S.) growth rate is greater than the sum of the growth of the next nine fastest growing countries combined and has covered most of the world’s net demand growth over the past two years. The U.S. position as the largest oil supplier in the world looks to be secure for many years.”¶ To give you an idea how fast this happened, news reports from earlier late last year estimated this wouldn’t happen until 2020. And China just recently surpassed the United States as the biggest oil importer.¶ United States oil production should average 12.1 million barrels per day in 2013, but how come US gas prices are still so high? While fracking shale oil has gotten much cheaper and efficient it’s still more costly than the relatively easy-to-reach Middle East oil. The average fracking rig is mounted on a 18-wheeler truck and has the horsepower of three Formula One racing cars necessary to raise the hydraulic pressure high enough. It takes about 10 days to drill a well while years ago it took over 15 days.¶ Part of the reason fracking is cost effective is because the oil futures markets have pushed the price of crude oil over $100 per barrel on the open market. Plus, only some of the fracking equipment has been shifted over from hunting for natural gas.¶ High Gas Prices: A US Political Problem¶ But you would assume since the United States now exports more oil than it imports that the economic rules of supply and demand should cause US gas prices to drop, right? Unfortunately, that’s where localized markets and politics have kept gas prices high.¶ Most of the surge in United States oil product has occurred in North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Oklahoma. Oil producers are fighting over limited oil pipeline capacity and are forced to use barges and trains, which increases the cost of domestic US oil by around $17 per barrel. But projects like the Keystone XL oil pipeline have been delayed by years due to politics.

#### Prices high now and supporting Russian economy --- decline in prices causes collapse

**Adomanis 13** - MA-Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford (Mark, Forbes, 3/14/2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/03/14/crude-oil-is-still-really-expensive-so-russia-will-probably-stay-stable/>) //RGP

Judah, like many Russia watchers, highlights the oil price trap as a potential downfall for Putin. As the report says: As a result, the Kremlin now must rely on a much higher oil price in order to balance its budget. In 2007, $40 a barrel would have sufﬁced. By 2012, more than $110 was required. Should the price of oil now fall for any substantial length of time, Russia could be forced to return to large scale borrowing, even cut beneﬁts or implement some form of austerity, thus undermining support for the regime in the provinces and among low-wage earners. It is ironic, but Putin’s support now depends upon the one thing he cannot control: the price of oil. I fully agree that a substantial and sustained fall in the price of oil would be pretty damaging for Putin, just as a substantial and sustained increase in the yield on Treasury Bills would be a pretty serious problem for the United States or a substantial fall in soy prices would be a serious problem for Brazil. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see that a substantial portion of Putin’s popularity rests on dolling out natural resource rents, and if those rents were suddenly to disappear then, yes, the Kremlin would be in real trouble. But you can look at almost any country in the world and imagine a scenario in which the increase or decrease in price of an important commodity or financial instrument would prove ruinous: they key question is how likely such a scenario is. So before we get too caught up in what might happen to Russia when oil prices decline, we should ask ourselves “how likely is it that oil prices are actually going to decline for any length of time?” Based on the available evidence I would say “extremely unlikely.” Consider the following charts. Here’s what has happened to the price for Brent crude since 1988, when Ronald Reagan was still fearlessly leading the free world to victory in the Cold War: The run-up in oil prices since 2000 doesn’t look like a temporary blip or an “accident,” it looks like increasingly expensive oil is just a fact of life for an increasingly dynamic and globalized world economy. So let’s focus on that post 2000 period, a period that, conveniently, coincides with the entirety of Vladimir Putin‘s time atop the Russian state: Since 2000, the only really noteworthy and sustained drop in world oil prices coincided with and was caused by an epochal financial crisis that very nearly crashed the entire global economy. Apart from that, oil prices have either been slowly increasing or holding steady. Indeed ever since oil prices really started to rebound towards the end of 2009 I have heard Russia watchers say “OK, oil is expensive now, and that helps Putin survive. But just wait until the price crashes, which is going to happen any day now!” They said this in 2010. They said this in 2011. They said this in 2012. And they’re saying it now in 2013. I suppose the oil price alarmists will be right at some point, we’re likely to eventually get another global recession that will crash commodity prices, but almost no one takes seriously the idea that commodities, and oil in particular, are just a lot more expensive now than they used to be and that this probably isn’t going to change any time soon. Is Russia’s over-reliance on oil a good thing, or is it somehow praiseworthy? No. If I were running the Kremlin I would be spooked by the increase in the non-oil and gas deficit and the ever rising price per barrel needed to balance the state budget. But the fact that a sustained and sharp decrease in the price of oil would be a disaster for the Kremlin doesn’t mean that such an decrease is any more likely. And if you look at the Energy Information Agency’s short-term price forecasts, the expectation in the short term is for an exceedingly gentle and gradual decline in oil prices to $108 a barrel in 2013 and $101 in 2014, while the long-term reference case is for a sustained and long-term rise in prices. Oil prices that are expected to average out at over $100 a barrel more than a year from now, and which will then begin a gradual rise, hardly seem like a harbinger of doom for the Kremlin. Perhaps I’m small-minded or unimaginative, but it’s very hard for me to conjur a scenario in which Putin’s political position is seriously threatened so long as oil is over $100 a barrel and in which the most likely scenario is for ever-rising price in the future. Could oil doom Putin? Yes. But it seems far more likely that, for better or worse, it’s going to continue to function as a crutch for Russia’s current regime.

#### Foreign strategic policy does not reflect domestic radicalism – nations will proliferate responsibly.

**Waltz 81** (Kenneth – London International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; [https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm%29//AB)

Third, many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad**.** States that are radical at home, how­ever, may not be radical abroad. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. Think of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The pressures of com­petition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that enable them to get along. States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their radical acts fall short of damaging vital interests of nuclear powers. States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest she suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state. That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence her by striking a con­ventional or nuclear blow. Nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states.

#### All leaders are sensitive to costs – deterrence applies for even “irrational” states

**Waltz 2** (Kenneth, Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, “More May Be Better” The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed)

Third, some new nuclear states may have governments and societies that are not well rooted. If a country is a loose collection of hostile tribes, if its leaders form a thin veneer atop a people partly nomadic, if the state has a history of authoritarian rule, its leaders may be freer of constraints than, and have different values from, those who rule older and more fully developed polities. Idi Amin and Muammar el-Qaddafi, rulers of Uganda and Libya, fit these categories, and they were favorite examples of the kind of rulers who supposedly could not be trusted to manage nuclear weapons responsibly. Despite wild rhetoric aimed at foreigners, however, both of these “irrational” rulers became cautious and modest when punitive actions against them might have threatened their ability to rule. Even though Amin lustily slaughtered members of tribes he disliked, he quickly stopped goading Britain when it seemed that it might intervene militarily. Qaddafi showed similar restraint. He and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat were openly hostile. In July of 1977, both launched commando attacks and air raids, including two large air strikes by Egypt on Libya’s el Adem air-base. However, neither side let the attacks get out of hand. Qaddafi showed himself to be forbearing and amenable to mediation by other Arab leaders. Shai Feldman used these and other examples to argue the Arab leaders are deterred from taking inordinate risks, not because they engage in intricate rational calculations but simply because they, like other rulers, are “sensitive to costs.”9 Saddam Hussein further illustrated the point during, and even prior to, the war of 1991. He invaded Kuwait only after the United States had given many indications that it would not oppose him or use military force to liberate a Kuwait conquered by Iraq. During the war, he launched missiles against Israel. But Iraq’s missiles were so lightly armed that little risk was run of prompting attacks more punishing than what Iraq was already suffering. Deterrence worked for the United States and for Israel as it has for every other nuclear state.

#### Nuclear prolif creates incentives for de-escalation and guarantees international stability – plus, new proliferators won’t be destabilizing.

**Asal & Beardsley, 07** [Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, 44:2, Sage] qp

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 03: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.Supporters of proliferation do not see leaders of new nuclear states as being fundamentally different from those of the old nuclear states in terms of their levels of responsibility (Arquilla, 97), nor do they see them facing unique challenges in managing and securing these weapons (Feaver, 92/93: 162–163). The response to the argument that small powers, non-Western powers, and military powers will behave less responsibly than the USA and other ‘responsible’ powers is that the evidence does not support the view that new nuclear powers are ‘different’ in the worst sense of the word (Lavoy, 95; Hagerty, 98; Arquilla, 97; Feldman, 95; Karl, 96/ 97). Van Creveld (93: 124) sums up this viewpoint when he points out that ‘where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared’. Dismissing the fear that deterrence will not work if the arsenal is not big enough or under enough control, Chellaney (95) contends that the Cold War is evidence that even minimum deterrence is sufficient. In support, Feaver (92/93: 186) argues that ‘even a modest nuclear arsenal should have some existential deterrent effect on regional enemies, precisely because decapitation is so difficult’. There are those who argue that security is increased at a systemic level when the number of nuclear states increases because of the level of uncertainty created when more than one or two players are playing with a nuclear deck. When this happens, ‘the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations’ (Brito & Intriligator, 1983: 137). Cimbala (93: 194) agrees, arguing that ‘it is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker’.

#### Proliferation stops miscalculation – risks of nuclear war are too clear.

**Roth, 07**  [Ariel Ilan, Associate Dir. National Security Studies – Johns Hopkins U. and Visiting Assistant Prof. IR – Goucher College, International Studies Review, “REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory”, 9, p. 369-384] QP

No such potential for miscalculation exists in a nuclear conflict. In several papers and articles, as well as a co-authored book, Waltz makes explicit his belief that nuclear weapons eliminate (or at least severely reduce) the likelihood of miscalculation of the degree to which a war will be costly. Because, according to Waltz, one of the main engines for war is uncertainty regarding outcomes and because the immense destruction that can come as the result of a nuclear exchange can be fully anticipated, it is never rational to engage in a war where the possibility of a nuclear exchange exists.Consequently, as Waltz (90:740) forcefully argues, ‘‘the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.’’

#### And, here’s evidence that goes more in depth on these points

**Deudney 1999** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural resources are depleted and degraded seems intuitively accurate. The popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with declining supplies of clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities for positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. Many fears of resource war are derived from the cataclysmic world wars of the first half of the twentieth century. Influenced by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources for great power status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims to achieve resource autonomy. 40 The aggression of Japan was directly related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and minerals, and faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial powers in Asia, the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rubber.41 Although the United States had a richer resource endowment than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial strangulation played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites about world strategy.42 During the Cold War, the presence of natural resources in the Third World helped turn this vast area into an arena for East-West conflict.43 Given this record, the scenario of conflicts over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order should be taken seriously. However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the familiar scenarios of resource war are of diminishing plausibility for the foreseeable future. First, the robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. During the 1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove states to pursue economic autarky, but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without territorial control of the resource source. As Ronnie Lipschutz has argued, this means that resource constraints are much less likely to generate interstate violence than in the past. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the growing difficulty that states face in obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives has made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in extensive areas, the spread of conventional weaponry and national consciousness has made it very costly for an invader, even one equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 45 At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and subduing territory, the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the "age of substitutability," in which industrial technology is increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually everything needed by modern societies.46 The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers, prices have fallen.47

#### There is no plausible scenario for resource wars

**Victor, 07** – Senior Fellow @ Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Woods Institute for the Environment (David, “What Resource Wars?”, 11/1/2007, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7344601/What-resource-wars-From-Arabia.html)

THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents cause conflict and war? There is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But resource-related conflicts are multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action to stem the dangers is long overdue.In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE wars are actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry--which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.

#### No resource wars – states don’t care

**NOW Lebanon 10** (February 10. NOW Lebanon, “Improbable War or Impossible Peace?”, <http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=145813> Pismarov)

“Water wars”, “the Blue Gold rush”, “the century of water wars”: These threatening formulas have emerged over the past few years. Future conflicts of varying intensity are predicted, and the control of hydra resources is at stake. The 20th century was supposedly that of the black gold wars. Ecological concerns have thus driven futurologists to dub the 21st century “the century of blue gold wars.” So many wars are in sight! One can live without petroleum, but not without water. Yet when looking at things from a historical perspective, one must consider these tragic predictions in context. The enumeration of the acts of violence that are directly linked to the control of aquifers since ancient times leads after much pain to a shorter list of less intense eruptions of violence, including riots and skirmishes between various villages . These are almost systematically localized, isolated, popular acts of violence. Governments are seemingly unwilling to allow themselves to be dragged into conflicts triggered by local problems. The paradox is as follows: The only resource that is indispensable for life generates minor tensions, whereas non-necessary, and even superfluous, resources have given rise to conflicts and inequalities, leading economists to speak of a “natural resources curse.”  This paradox prevails among Middle Eastern leaders. “With water you can make politics. With land you can make war,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a seminar on the sustainable management of water in 1995 . Israeli and Palestinian officials make only a marginal reference to the water issue in their public speeches. This is a long way behind the issue of security for the Israelis, and the issues of refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem for the Palestinians. One should certainly keep in mind that such a statement by the Israeli prime minister was politically motivated, but this position is symptomatic of the symbolic value of “land” and the instrumental value of “water”. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that while water is, in all likelihood, not an issue in a future war, it is still a herald of peace. In fact, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are the most arid regions of the globe. In the Middle East, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel are the only countries that are relatively spared from water shortages. Syria is in a situation of hydric stress. In other words, according to the United Nations, available resources are estimated between 1,000 and 1,700 m3 per individual per year. Other countries in the region suffer from hydric shortage (less than 1,000 m3 per individual per year). The average level of water resources in the region hovers around 1,400 m3 per individual per year. This level will witness a 50% decrease by 2025 due to population growth. Agriculture squanders up to 90% of freshwater supplies compared to a world average of 70% , while industry and domestic use make up the remaining 10%. One of the most contentious issues in the region is Israel’s water consumption, which is several times higher than that of its neighbors due to treaties that grant it privileged access to the region’s hydric resources. Yet these tensions do not underlie the disputes between those countries. The unequal division of water resources is actually just one dimension of these disputes, and not necessarily a dimension that drives crises to escalate.

#### And, Long timeframes decrease probability—the more distant the prediction, the more likely it is to be wrong

**POSNER 2004** (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 17)

A compelling reason for not giving a great deal of thought to the remote future is the difficulty, often the impossibility, of making accurate predictions beyond a few years. People in the year 1000 could have had only the vaguest conception of what the world would be like in the year 2004, and we can have only the vaguest conception of what it will be like in the year 3000, let alone the year 1,000,000. We have better predictive methods than people in 1000 did, but on the other had the rate of technological change is higher now than it was then. Lacking the requisite foreknowledge we can’t know what we should be doing now to forestall the disasters that are possible, maybe even likely, on that timescale.

#### Sustainable multilateralism is structurally impossible and there are a litany of major alt causes the aff can’t overcome

**Held et al, 13** – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level

#### Tons of alt causes - powerful states bypass organizations, UN bureaucracy and systematic factors

**Thakur 11**– (Ramesh, Professor of International Relations and Foundation Director of the Centre for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University in Canberra, “The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current andFuture Challenges”<http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/initiatives/GlobalGovernance/Thakur_GA_Thematic_Debate_on_UN_in_GG.pdf>) DF

In an interdependent, globalized and networked world,multilateralism will continue to be a key aspect of international relations. Limitations do and always will exist. The utility and effectiveness of formal multilateral institutions are, inevitably, conditioned and constrained by the exigencies of power. Powerful states may work through or around multilateral institutions at their pleasure and selectively. Some issues may defy multilateral approaches. Changing normative expectations may cast doubt on the¶ constitutive values of specific international institutions. But the theoretical rationale of¶I nstitutionalism – that all states benefit from a world in which agreed rules and common¶ norms bind the behaviour of all actors – is broadly intact and indisputable.¶All actors depend upon multilateralism and the underwriting of regularity and public¶ goods in the international system. But if they are to remain viable, international organizations and the values of multilateralism embedded in them must be reconstituted in line with 21st century principles of governance and legitimacy. Just a simportantly, they must be capable of addressing contemporary challenges effectively. This may involve moving beyond the original roots of multilateralism, reassessing the values on which¶ multilateralism is based and promoted, and recognizing that contemporary and prospective challenges call for more agility, nimbleness, flexibility, adaptability and anticipatory rather than always reactive solutions.¶ At the centre of the existing multilateral order is the United Nations. Of course one part¶of the United Nations is an international bureaucracy with many failings and flaws and a¶ forum often used for finger pointing, not problem solving. Too often hasit demonstrated¶a failure to tackle urgent collective action problems due to institutionalized inability,¶ incapacity or unwillingness. Yet the world body remains the embodiment of the¶international community, the focus of international expectations and the locus of¶collective action as the symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers.¶Moreover, the UN record since 1945 demonstrates an under‐appreciated capacity for¶policy innovation, institutional adaptation and organizational learning, for example with¶respect to peacekeeping gmissions.That said, without continual structural and procedural reforms, the legitimacy and¶performance deficits will accumulate and there will be an intensifying crisis of confidence¶in the world’s system of organized multilateralism centred on the United Nations. The¶values and institutions of formalized multilateralism as currently constituted are neither¶optimally effective nor legitimate. The chief multilateral organizations do not meet¶current standards of representivity, consent, juridical accountability, rule of law, broad¶participation, and transparency – and therefore political legitimacy. This is an acute¶problem precisely because international organizations play an increasingly important and¶intrusive role in people’s lives. The more this happens, the more people will realize that¶multilateralism is value‐laden, connoting fundamental social and political choices¶regarding the balance between the market and equity, human rights, governance, and¶democracy. A range of public policy decisions and practices have been transferred to the¶international level,raising a number of pressing normative challenges to the Westphalian foundations o fmultilateralism as citizens become rights holders and states are deemed to¶have responsibilities of sovereignty.¶That is, the challenge to the values and institutions of multilateralism results not merely¶For many particular distribution of power, but also from systemic factors like the nature ofthe state, the nature of power, the nature of security and threats to international security, the actors who drive security and insecurity, and the global norms that regulate the international behaviour of state and nonstate actors alike.

#### Unilateralism is sustainable - it is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)//VP

Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts. This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### Their unsustainable arg only looks at single indicators of power, not the totality

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 11 –** both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen G Brooks & William C Wohlforth (2011): Assessing the balance, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 201-219

We welcome this exchange, but readers might be excused for thinking that it has been overtaken by events. Isn't multipolarity just around the corner, as Christopher Layne seems to argue? Is not America in decline, 'this time, for real,' as Gideon Rachman (2011) proclaimed? *World out of balance* should not-and, frankly, can not fairly-be read as claiming that history has stopped and power relations have frozen. America's relative capabilities have declined in recent years, but, as most of the contributors to this exchange recognize, its lead in overall capabilities is so substantial that the world will remain 'out of balance' for some time to come. It remains imperative for international relations (IR) scholars to get American primacy right, something we showed they had failed to do. That was our main point. Most of our critics agree. The world remains out of balance because comprehensive, aggregate capabilities-the kind of capabilities powers need to create and sustain global orders-remain concentrated in the United States to a historically unprecedented degree not anticipated by IR theory. Scholars from Morgenthau to Gilpin and Waltz (and Charles Glaser in this symposium) have long recognized that what matters when thinking about these questions is a state's share of aggregated power capabilities: raw economic heft, technological prowess, military and naval power, innovation, organizational-institutional competence, size and location, the lot. As seductive as it is to single out one index - so much easier to measure! - it is misleading because each element interacts with others to support a state's capacity to ad on the international stage. If you read carefully the heralds of multipolarity, you will notice a near myopic focus on aggregate gross domestic product (GDP). Yet by that measure, India would have surpassed Britain in the mid-nineteenth century--obviously not a good measure of their relative capabilities. Forecasting precisely when China's aggregate GDP will surpass America's is a highly uncertain game. But what we can be certain of is that matching US aggregate GDP will not make China America's peer in overall capabilities. As scholars who have studied power assessment and forecasts over the years, we are wen aware that neither economists nor political scientists nor country experts possess crystal balls that tell them when one state's overall capacity will cross a certain threshold. *World out of balance* certainly does not pretend to perform such magic. The book is about how the world works when the scales of power are out of balance. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the myriad social, economic, technological, and institutional factors that underlie China's power will all line up favourably so as to propel it *and* that the similarly complex set of factors underlying US power will all conspire against it. We cannot rule out the possibility that, in addition, Beijing will make all the right decisions and Washington all the wrong ones. Nor can we rule out the possibility that the other major states in Asia and globally will seek to facilitate China's rise and hasten America's decline. And were that concatenation to occur, yes, we might see a very consequential shift in aggregate power relations in a comparatively short time. Although many things are possible, in social science we work with probabilities; and the balance of what we know about economic growth, technological change, diplomatic relationships, institutional and political stability and adaptability, all suggest that a rapid end of a single superpower world is extremely unlikely.

# 1nr

#### Growth prevents conflict escalation – solves the case impacts

**Griswold 7**

Daniel, Trade Policy Studies @ Cato, 4/20/’7, Trade, Democracy and Peace, http://www.freetrade.org/node/681

A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

#### Decline causes nuclear war and turns multilat

**Merlini 11**

Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

#### Obama pushing – top priority – no thumpers

**Reuters 10/16**

Obama plans immigration push after fiscal crisis ends, 10/16/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-usa-obama-immigration-idUSBRE99F01Q20131016

President Barack Obama said on Tuesday that stalled immigration reform would be a top priority once the fiscal crisis has been resolved.¶ "Once that's done, you know, the day after, I'm going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform," he told the Los Angeles affiliate of Spanish-language television network Univision.¶ The president's domestic agenda has been sidetracked in his second term by one problem after another. As he coped with the revelation of domestic surveillance programs, chemical weapons in Syria, and a fiscal battle that has shut down the U.S. government and threatens a debt default, immigration has been relegated to the back burner.¶ But Obama, who won re-election with overwhelming Hispanic backing, had hoped to make reforms easing the plight of the 11 million immigrants who are in the United States illegally.¶ In June, the Senate passed an immigration overhaul, but House of Representatives Republicans are divided over the granting of legal status to those in the country illegally, a step many see as rewarding lawbreakers.¶ Although the president had sought comprehensive reform, he said last month he would be open to the House taking a piece-by-piece approach if that would get the job done.

#### Obama spending PC

**Martosko 10/16**

David, Daily Mail US Political Editor, ARMAGEDDON AVERTED: Republicans cave in as Democrats' debt ceiling bill passes Senate with only House to go before midnight default deadline can cause global chaos, 10/16/13, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2463149/Senate-passes-debt-fix-Cruz-goes-swinging-McConnell-carves-2-billion-pet-project.html

After losing such a high-stakes game of political poker, the GOP will now shoulder the burden of being blamed for the fiasco that led to serious fears of a fresh economic catastrophe and dragged America's global reputation through the mud.¶ Meanwhile, House and Senate managers are working to push a result across the finish line by midnight.¶ 'We are not putting odds on anything,' said White House press secretary Jay Carney in his afternoon briefing, but he urged both houses of Congress to 'act swiftly' and 'as soon as possible' to avoid economic disaster.¶ Carney then took questions about President Obama's plans to leverage his new-found political capital in a bid to reform America's immigration system, a move he told the Spanish-language Univision network on Tuesday that he would undertake 'the day after' Congress solved the debt crisis.

#### Will pass – time and Republican will – specific to their warrants

**Foley 10/17**

Elise, Huffington Post, Obama To House On Immigration: If You Have Ideas, 'Let's Hear Them', 10/17/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/17/obama-house-immigration\_n\_4115818.html

President Barack Obama vowed Thursday to restart his push for comprehensive immigration reform this year after a bruising fight on government spending that only increased bad blood between the two parties.¶ "The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do, and it's sitting there waiting for the House to pass it," he said during remarks from the White House. "Now if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let's hear them. Let's start the negotiations. But let's not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years."¶ "This can and should get done by the end of this year," he added.¶ Obama and immigration reform advocates have insisted there's still time and the will to pass reform, even though House Republicans are showing little interest in doing so. After the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration bill in June, reform stalled in the house when House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) vowed not to pick it up, regardless of likely support from most Democrats and some Republicans. Instead, the House GOP vowed to pass piecemeal measures -- with no talk of a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants -- that have now faded from attention.

#### Will pass – new momentum

**Matthews 10/17**

Laura, International Business Times, Immigration Reform 2013: ‘Finish The Job,’ Obama Tells Congress, 10/17/13, http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-2013-finish-job-obama-tells-congress-1430650

In addition to pursing a balanced budget and finding consensus on a farm bill, Obama urged Congress to finish the work started on comprehensive immigration reform. The momentum pro-reform advocates saw earlier this year died off with the fiscal fight that ended Wednesday night, but now the president thinks it can come back. ¶ “We should finish the job of fixing our broken immigration system,” Obama said at a White House conference on Thursday. “There is already a broad coalition across America that’s behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform.” The Senate passed its 2013 comprehensive immigration reform bill in June, which included an increase in border security and a 13-year path to citizenship for immigrants in the country without legal papers. However, House Republicans have said they will not act on that measure unless it is supported by a majority of their caucus.¶ “The majority of Americans thinks this is the right thing to do,” Obama said. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear ‘em. Let’s start the negotiations.”¶ Obama encouraged lawmakers to not put off the problem for another year or longer.¶ “This can and should get done by the end of this year,” he said.¶ In response to the president's call for action on immigration reform, American’s Voice, a pro-reform group, said the principal question remains whether House Speaker John Boehner will act.¶ The group’s Executive Director, Frank Sharry, called Obama’s offer a “get-out-of-jail card” being offered to Boehner and “smart” House Republicans.¶ “Working with Democrats to pass reform will help the GOP rehabilitate their badly damaged brand, solve a huge political problem facing the GOP with respect to Latino, Asian and immigrant voters, and prove to the American people they can govern responsibly rather than recklessly,” Sharry said in a statement. “The window of opportunity is open now. The goal should be to move through the House in a way that leads to bicameral negotiations with the Senate this year and a bill to the President’s desk as soon as possible.”

#### Winners-win theory is wrong --- Obama’s first term proves

**Calmes 11/13** (Jackie, International Herald Tribune, “Obama looks to budget talks as an opportunity to take control of agenda; News Analysis,” 11/13/2012, Factiva, CMR)

Whether Mr. Obama succeeds will reveal much about what kind of president he intends to be in his second term. Beyond the specifics of any accord, perhaps the bigger question hanging over the negotiations is whether Mr. Obama will go to his second inaugural in January with an achievement that starts to rewrite the unflattering leadership narrative that, fairly or not, came to define his first term for many people.¶ That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies — in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a **leading scholar of the presidency** at Texas A&M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama’s presidency is titled ‘‘Overreach,’’ said, ‘‘He didn’t understand the limits of what he could do.’’¶‘‘They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we’d build this advancing-tide theory of legislation,’’ Mr. Edwards said. ‘‘And that was **very naïve, very silly**. Well, they’ve learned a lot, I think.’’¶ ‘‘Effective leaders,’’ he added, **‘‘exploit opportunities rather than create them.’’**

#### Political capital is finite

**Gangale,** San Francisco State political science lecturer**, 5**

(Thomas, poli sci lecturer @ SF State, 1/23/5, “To Amend or Not to Amend”, http://pweb.jps.net/~gangale/opsa/ps2/ToAmendOrNotToAmend.htm) JPG

Abolishing the Electoral College is somewhat of a progressive issue in that it is based on the principle of "one person, one vote." However, more than anything it is a "large states vs. small states" issue, and that is why it is a perennial loser. The reality is that there are many more Idahos and Nebraskas than there are Californias and New Yorks, and since a small state has as many votes in the US Senate as a large state, any proposal to do away with the Electoral College cannot hope to win the required two-thirds majority. It is destined to defeat. Even worse, the issue pits progressive states large and small against each other, weakening progressive solidarity. **If you fight someone tooth-and-nail on one issue, it’s hard to muster any more than lukewarm support on another issue on which you agree. Political capital is like ammunition: use too much of it up in an unwise action, and you have to wait to be resupplied**. Meanwhile, **your forces may be** in disarray and **vulnerable** **to** a **counterstrike**. Abolishing the Electoral College isn’t the only constitutional amendment that’s being bandied about this year. There’s also talk of an amendment to ban gay marriage.

#### Winner’s Win not true for Obama

Galston, 10 [William, Senior Fellow for Governance Studies – Brookings Institution, “President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties”, 11-4, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/110 4\_obama\_galston.aspx]

Rather than doing this, President Obama allowed himself to get trapped in legislative minutia, even as the country remained mired in a kind of economic slump that most Americans had never experienced and could not understand. Their reaction combined confusion and fear, which the president did little to allay. Ironically, a man who attained the presidency largely on the strength of his skills as a communicator did not communicate effectively during his first two years. He paid a steep political price for his failure. From the beginning, the administration operated on two fundamental political premises that turned out to be mistaken. The first was that the economic collapse had opened the door to the comprehensive change Obama had promised. As incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel famously put it, “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” In fact, as Emanuel himself came to realize, there was a tension between the steps needed to arrest the economic decline and the measures needed to actualize the president’s vision of fundamental change. The financial bailout and the stimulus package made it harder, not easier, to pass comprehensive health reform. Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and-trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists. The legislative process that produced the health care bill was especially damaging. It lasted much too long and featured side-deals with interest groups and individual senators, made in full public view. Much of the public was dismayed by what it saw. Worse, the seemingly endless health care debate strengthened the view that the president’s agenda was poorly aligned with the economic concerns of the American people. Because the administration never persuaded the public that health reform was vital to our economic future, the entire effort came to be seen as diversionary, even anti-democratic. The health reform bill was surely a moral success; it may turn out to be a policy success; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was—and remains—a political liability. Indeed, most of the Obama agenda turned out to be very unpopular. Of five major policy initiatives undertaken during the first two years, only one—financial regulatory reform—enjoyed majority support. In a September 2010 Gallup survey, 52 percent of the people disapproved of the economic stimulus, 56 percent disapproved of both the auto rescue and the health care bill, and an even larger majority—61 percent—rejected the bailout of financial institutions.[[v]](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/1104_obama_galston.aspx%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn5) Democrats’ hopes that the people would change their minds about the party’s signature issue—universal health insurance—after the bill passed were not fulfilled.  (It remains to be seen whether sentiment will change in coming years as provisions of the bill are phased in—that is, if they survive what will no doubt be stiff challenges in both Congress and the states.)

#### Any risk of a link proves Obama loses PC

#### Reform key to India relations

**LA Times 12**

[Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>] 11/9

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### Solves laundry list of global conflicts – spills over and solves Asian power vacuum

**Armitage et al ’10** [Richard is the President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State. R. Nicholas Burns is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for New American Security. “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New American Security, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf>]

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually **all major global challenges**. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.